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  • Rabia Rahimbayeva
    Rabia Rahimbayeva    Group moderator   Ambassador
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    Obama Enters the Great Game
    Dear Members and Dear Friends,

    Barack Obama was sworn as a President of U.S.A. officially today... A new (may be not) stage is starting...

    I would like to share with you, a very interesting and valuable aricle by George Friedman, which was published in "Stratfor". I suggest to find time to read all text, which is really long but carries rather interesting information:

    * * * * * *
    U.S. President-elect Barack Obama will be sworn in on Tuesday as president of the United States. Candidate Obama said much about what he would do as president; now we will see what President Obama actually does. The most important issue Obama will face will be the economy, something he did not anticipate through most of his campaign. The first hundred days of his presidency thus will revolve around getting a stimulus package passed. But Obama also is now in the great game of global competition — and in that game, presidents rarely get to set the agenda.

    The major challenge he faces is not Gaza; the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is not one any U.S. president intervenes in unless he wants to experience pain. As we have explained, that is an intractable conflict to which there is no real solution. Certainly, Obama will fight being drawn into mediating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during his first hundred days in office. He undoubtedly will send the obligatory Middle East envoy, who will spend time with all the parties, make suitable speeches and extract meaningless concessions from all sides. This envoy will establish some sort of process to which everyone will cynically commit, knowing it will go nowhere. Such a mission is not involvement — it is the alternative to involvement, and the reason presidents appoint Middle East envoys. Obama can avoid the Gaza crisis, and he will do so.

    * OBAMA's TWO UNVOIDABLE CRISES:
    The two crises that cannot be avoided are Afghanistan and Russia. First, the situation in Afghanistan is tenuous for a number of reasons, and it is not a crisis that Obama can avoid decisions on. Obama has said publicly that he will decrease his commitments in Iraq and increase them in Afghanistan. He thus will have more troops fighting in Afghanistan. The second crisis emerged from a decision by Russia to cut off natural gas to Ukraine, and the resulting decline in natural gas deliveries to Europe. This one obviously does not affect the United States directly, but even after flows are restored, it affects the Europeans greatly. Obama therefo re comes into office with three interlocking issues: Afghanistan, Russia and Europe. In one sense, this is a single issue — and it is not one that will wait.

    Obama clearly intends to follow Gen. David Petraeus’ lead in Afghanistan. The intention is to increase the number of troops in Afghanistan, thereby intensifying pressure on the Taliban and opening the door for negotiations with the militant group or one of its factions. Ultimately, this would see the inclusion of the Taliban or Taliban elements in a coalition government. Petraeus pursued this strategy in Iraq with Sunni insurgents, and it is the likely strategy in Afghanistan.

    But the situation in Afghanistan has been complicated by the situation in Pakistan. Roughly three-quarters of U.S. and NATO supplies bound for Afghanistan are delivered to the Pakistani port of Karachi and trucked over the border to Afghanistan. Most fuel used by Western forces in Afghanistan is refined in Pakistan and delivered via the same route. There are two crossing points, one near Afghanistan’s Kandahar province at Chaman, Pakistan, and the other through the Khyber Pass. The Taliban have attacked Western supply depots and convoys, and Pakistan itself closed the routes for several days, citing government operations a gainst radical Islamist forces.

    Meanwhile, the situation in Pakistan has been complicated by tensions with India. The Indians have said that the individuals who carried out the Nov. 26 Mumbai attack were Pakistanis supported by elements in the Pakistani government. After Mumbai, India made demands of the Pakistanis. While the situation appears to have calmed, the future of Indo-Pakistani relations remains far from clear; anything from a change of policy in New Delhi to new terrorist attacks could see the situation escalate. The Pakistanis have made it clear that a heightened threat from India requires them to shift troops away from the Afghan border and toward the east; a small number of troops already has been shifted.

    Apart from the direct impact this kind of Pakistani troop withdrawal would have on cross-border operations by the Taliban, such a move also would dramatically increase the vulnerability of NATO supply lines through Pakistan. Some supplies could be shipped in by aircraft, but the vast bulk of supplies — petroleum, ammunition, etc. — must come in via surface transit, either by truck, rail or ship. Western operations in Afghanistan simply cannot be supplied from the air alone. A cutoff of the supply lines across Pakistan would thus leave U.S. troops in Afghanistan in crisis. Because Washington can’t predict or control the future actions of Pakistan, of India or of terrorists, the United States must find an alternative to the routes through Pakistan.

    When we look at a map, the two routes through Pakistan from Karachi are clearly the most logical to use. If those were closed — or even meaningfully degraded — the only other viable routes would be through the former Soviet Union.

    One route, along which a light load of fuel is currently transported, crosses the Caspian Sea. Fuel refined in Armenia is ferried across the Caspian to Turkmenistan (where a small amount of fuel is also refined), then shipped across Turkmenistan directly to Afghanistan and through a small spit of land in Uzbekistan. This route could be expanded to reach either the Black Sea through Georgia or the Mediterranean through Georgia and Turkey (though the additional use of Turkey would require a rail gauge switch). It is also not clear that transports native to the Caspian have sufficient capacity for this.

    Another route sidesteps the issues of both transport across the Caspian and the sensitivity of Georgia by crossing Russian territory above the Caspian. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan (and likely at least a small corner of Turkmenistan) would connect the route to Afghanistan. There are options of connecting to the Black Sea or transiting to Europe through either Ukraine or Belarus.

    Iran could provide a potential alternative, but relations between Tehran and Washington would have to improve dramatically before such discussions could even begin — and time is short.

    Many of the details still need to be worked out. But they are largely variations on the two main themes of either crossing the Caspian or transiting Russian territory above it.

    Though the first route is already partially established for fuel, it is not clear how much additional capacity exists. To complicate matters further, Turkmen acquiescence is unlikely without Russian authorization, and Armenia remains strongly loyal to Moscow as well. While the current Georgian government might leap at the chance, the issue is obviously an extremely sensitive one for Moscow. (And with Russian forces positioned in Azerbaijan and the Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow has troops looming over both sides of the vulnerable route across Georgia.) The second option would require crossing Russian territory itself, with a number of options — from connecting to the Black Sea to transiting either Ukraine or Belarus to Europe, or connecting to the Baltic states.

    Both routes involve countries of importance to Russia where Moscow has influence, regardless of whether those countries are friendly to it. This would give Russia ample opportunity to scuttle any such supply line at multiple points for reasons wholly unrelated to Afghanistan.

    If the West were to opt for the first route, the Russians almost certainly would pressure Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan not to cooperate, and Turkey would find itself in a position it doesn’t want to be in — namely, caught between the United States and Russia. The diplomatic complexities of developing these routes not only involve the individual countries included, they also inevitably lead to the question of U.S.-Russian relations.

    Even without crossing Russia, both of these two main options require Russian cooperation. The United States must develop the option of an alternative supply route to Pakistan, and in doing so, it must define its relationship with Russia. Seeking to work without Russian approval of a route crossing its “near abroad” will represent a challenge to Russia. But getting Russian approval will require a U.S. accommodation with the country.

    * THE RUSSIAN NATURAL GAS CONNECTION :
    One of Obama’s core arguments against the Bush administration was that it acted unilaterally rather than with allies. Specifically, Obama meant that the Bush administration alienated the Europeans, therefore failing to build a sustainable coalition for the war. By this logic, it follows that one of Obama’s first steps should be to reach out to Europe to help influence or pressure the Russians, given that NATO has troops in Afghanistan and Obama has said he intends to ask the Europeans for more help there.

    The problem with this is that the Europeans are passing through a serious crisis with Russia, and that Germany in particular is involved in trying to manage that crisis. This problem relates to natural gas. Ukraine is dependent on Russia for about two-thirds of the natural gas it uses. The Russians traditionally have provided natural gas at a deep discount to former Soviet republics, primarily those countries Russia sees as allies, such as Belarus or Armenia. Ukraine had received discounted natural gas, too, until the 2004 Orange Revolution, when a pro-Western government came to power in Kiev. At that point, the Russians began demanding full payment. Given the subsequent rises in global energy prices, that left Ukraine in a terrible situation — which of course is exactly where Moscow wanted it.

    The Russians cut off natural gas to Ukraine for a short period in January 2006, and for three weeks in 2009. Apart from leaving Ukraine desperate, the cutoff immediately affected the rest of Europe, because the natural gas that goes to Europe flows through Ukraine. This put the rest of Europe in a dangerous position, particularly in the face of bitterly cold weather in 2008-2009.

    The Russians achieved several goals with this. First, they pressured Ukraine directly. Second, they forced many European states to deal with Moscow directly rather than through the European Union. Third, they created a situation in which European countries had to choose between supporting Ukraine and heating their own homes. And last, they drew Berlin in particular — since Germany is the most dependent of the major European states on Russian natural gas — into the position of working with the Russians to get Ukraine to agree to their terms. (Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin visited Germany last week to discuss this directly with German Chancellor Angela Merkel.)

    The Germans already have made clear their opposition to expanding NATO to Ukraine and Georgia. Given their dependency on the Russians, the Germans are not going to be supporting the United States if Washington decides to challenge Russia over the supply route issue. In fact, the Germans — and many of the Europeans — are in no position to challenge Russia on anything, least of all on Afghanistan. Overall, the Europeans see themselves as having limited interests in the Afghan war, and many already are planning to reduce or withdraw troops for budgetary reasons.

    It is therefore very difficult to see Obama recruiting the Europeans in any useful manner for a confrontation with Russia over access for American supplies to Afghanistan. Yet this is an issue he will have to address immediately.

    * THE PRICE of RUSSIAN COPERATION:
    The Russians are prepared to help the Americans, however — and it is clear what they will want in return.

    At minimum, Moscow will want a declaration that Washington will not press for the expansion of NATO to Georgia or Ukraine, or for the deployment of military forces in non-NATO states on the Russian periphery — specifically, Ukraine and Georgia. At this point, such a declaration would be symbolic, since Germany and other European countries would block expansion anyway.

    The Russians might also demand some sort of guarantee that NATO and the United States not place any large military formations or build any major military facilities in the former Soviet republics (now NATO member states) of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. (A small rotating squadron of NATO fighters already patrols the skies over the Baltic states.) Given that there were intense anti-government riots in Latvia and Lithuania last week, the stability of these countries is in question. The Russians would certainly want to topple the pro-Western Baltic governments. And anything approaching a formal agreement between Russia and the United States on the matter could quickly destabilize the Baltics, in addition to very much weakening the NATO alliance.

    Another demand the Russians probably will make — because they have in the past — is that the United States guarantee eventual withdrawal from any bases in Central Asia in return for Russian support for using those bases for the current Afghan campaign. (At present, the United States runs air logistics operations out of Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan.) The Russians do not want to see Central Asia become a U.S. sphere of influence as the result of an American military presence.

    Other demands might relate to the proposed U.S. ballistic missile defense installations in the Czech Republic and Poland.

    We expect the Russians to make variations on all these demands in exchange for cooperation in creating a supply line to Afghanistan. Simply put, the Russians will demand that the United States acknowledge a Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union. The Americans will not want to concede this — or at least will want to make it implicit rather than explicit. But the Russians will want this explicit, because an explicit guarantee will create a crisis of confidence over U.S. guarantees in the countries that emerged from the Soviet Union, serving as a lever to draw these countries into the Russian orbit. U.S. acquiescence on the point potentially would have ripple effects in the rest of Europe, too.

    Therefore, regardless of the global financial crisis, Obama has an immediate problem on his hands in Afghanistan. He has troops fighting there, and they must be supplied. The Pakistani supply line is no longer a sure thing. The only other options either directly challenge Russia (and ineffectively at that) or require Russian help. Russia’s price will be high, particularly because Washington’s European allies will not back a challenge to Russia in Georgia, and all options require Russian cooperation anyway. Obama’s plan to recruit the Europeans on behalf of American initiatives won’t work in this case. Obama does not want to start his administration with making a massive concession to Russia, but he cannot afford to leave U.S. forces in Afghanistan without supplies. He can hope that nothing happens in Pakistan, but that is up to the Taliban and other Islamist groups more than anyone else — and betting on their goodwill is not a good idea.

    Whatever Obama is planning to do, he will have to deal with this problem fast, before Afghanistan becomes a crisis. And there are no good solutions. But unlike with the Israelis and Palestinians, Obama can’t solve this by sending a special envoy who appears to be doing something. He will have to make a very tough decision. Between the economy and this crisis, we will find out what kind of president Obama is.

    And we will find out very soon."

    By George Friedman / Stratfor
    ------------------------------------------------

    Kind Regards,
    Rabia Rahimbayeva.
    • 20 Jan 2009, 11:09 pm
  • Rabia Rahimbayeva
    Rabia Rahimbayeva    Group moderator   Ambassador
    The company name is only visible to registered members.
    Turkish-American Relations in the Obama Presidency: What Will Change?
    * Interview with Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sedat Laciner, head of the USAK
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The director of the Ankara-based Turkish think tank USAK Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sedat Laciner evaluates the future of the Turkish-American Relations under the Obama administration.

    * Question 1: How do you evaluate the future of Turkish-American relations under the Obama administration?

    S.L.: "During the Bush presidency, the relations between Turkey and US were severely damaged. The Washington administration has an immense responsibility in this case. Turkey gave full support to the US' combat against terror. In this regard, Ankara sent Turkish soldiers to Afghanistan and acted in accordance with its Western allies in order to capture the militants of Al-Qaeda in Turkey or anywhere. Meanwhile, Turkey undertook a constructive role in the Middle East problems. However, when the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) rejected the US' request to base US troops in Turkey for an assault on Iraq on March 1, 2003, the US' Turkey policy was completely changed. As a result, Washington started to implement a punishment strategy against Turkey. Turkey is a democratic country and the government must implement its policies in line with the decisions of the parliament. The Turkish Government sincerely wanted to pass the 1 March Parlaiment Note to allow the US troops to use Turkish territories, yet the Government had no option but to implement the taken decision."

    * Question 2: In this regard, has Turkey's rejection of the 1 March Bill cost too much to the US?

    S.L.: "Of course, if it were possible for the US troops to use Turkey's territory, it would definitely become easier for US to invade Iraq. But, the US administration made a fatal mistake. They did not pay enough attention to the Turkish parliament and did not respect its pluralism principle. In this period, the US promised to provide a huge credit at an amount of 30 billion dollars and thought that Turkey could not reject its request to use Turkey's territory (because, Turkey was trying to recover its economy after the 2001 great economic crisis). The US expected to exploit from Turkey's difficult situation. The sarcastic expressions of some American politicians caused a negative impact on Turkish parliamentarians and Turkish people. As a result Turkish democracy decided and it said "no' to the US soldiers. If the US could use Turkish route, of course the risks in the operation would have been decreased a lot.

    Although the US could not enter Iraq from Northern part of Turkey, the US was surprisingly not seriously affected in terms of military bases. One of the most important reasons for this was the errant strategy of Saddam Hussein. Saddam did not presume that Turkey would refuse permission for US troops and deployed a large amount of soldiers in the northern part of the country. Meanwhile, the Kurdish collaborators with the US in the North also prevented the passage of Saddam's soldiers. Thanks to these developments, Iraq was occupied by US troops in a very short time and it was brought under the control of US with very few casualties. In this regard, it is not possible to say that the Turkey's rejection of the US paved the way to a big tragedy, as the Vice President of US Dick Cheney and some other politicians had claimed in the recent past. The US did not have many difficulties during the invasion of Iraq, but after the invasion.

    The problems of the US in Iraq did not begin during the invasion, but later. The US easily occupied Iraq easily but could not administer the occupied territory. The US soldiers created serious problems in the region due to their wrong strategy, human rights violations, and being unaccustomed to the indigenous people. At this point, Turkey offered help to the US and the Turkish parliament ratified the decision to send Turkish soldiers to Iraq to help the US as a result of the intense efforts of the Erdogan government. However, the US did not show any desire to accept Turkey's attempts and made a special effort to keep Turkey and Turkish approach outside Iraq and outside the region. It can be said that the policies of the Bush administration regarding the Iraq issue were founded on the ground of punishing Turkey and to keep it outside the Middle East and Iraqi issues. In addition, the US did not give any support to Turkey in combating terrorism during this period, especially between the years 2003 and 2007.

    Furthermore, many people in Turkey even stated that the US supported PKK terrorism. During this period, Turkish public opinion showed a strong and unprecedented reaction against the US' approach to PKK terrorism and the Kurdish issue. Almost every political group in Turkey thinks that the US was not candid about the PKK terrorism. In this context, the terrorism problem still remains the most important issue between the two countries.
    This mistakes which occurred during the Bush administration would definitely pave the way to further problems in the upcoming years. Unfortunately, some people in Washington think that Turkish society can forget the bad things easily. Yet, this is not a true analysis. One of the most significant reasons for the Turkish parliament's rejection of the 1 March Bill was the repercussions from the two countries' previous run-ins. The Turkish intellectuals, bureaucrats, media, experts, and even laymen do not forget the US's biased behaviors regarding the 1964 Johnson Letter, the US's arms embargo on Turkey respecting Cyprus, and pro-Greek stance of the US in many occasions and the Armenian issue. Unfortunately, the Bush administration added new damaging even traumatic memories to the previous ones. Besides, the US soldiers headed bag the Turkish soldiers in northern Iraq. With these actions, the US not only punished, but also insulted Turkey. All of these bad memories would be remembered by the Turkish people and affect the relations between the two countries in the future. I am sure that no single Turkish soldier and citizen can forget the bag affair in coming years.

    In this context, the new president must be aware of this heritage with good sides and with the sins and try to take action to eliminate the bad memories. He should ease the damages in the relations."

    * Question 3: Finally, what do you want to advise the new US President?

    S.L.: "First of all, the new president must give full support to Turkey about combating terrorism via a strong message. Although Iraq has been kept under the control of the US for about six years, up to now, the US military forces has not caught or arrested or judged any PKK terrorist. The PKK became stronger under the US occupation rule. In the following days, if the Obama administration could make a contribution by apprehending a famous name from the PKK, it would positively affect the US' image in the eyes of Turkish people. The US should do something in the PKK issue really important valuable to the Turkish people because the people here see the US somehow responsible for the increasing PKK terror.
    Secondly, Obama must not act in line with the desires of the ultra-nationalist Armenian Diaspora. The US should keep its impartiality in the issue. While a historical dialogue process has been launched between Ankara and Yerevan, any radical expressions from Obama could damage this process. Obama should concentrate on today's problems rather than historical Armenian claims and support the efforts of rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia. He should not be emotional but realist. The only aim should be to establish Turkish-Armenian friendship on mutual interests of US, Armenia and Turkey.

    Third, the EU membership of Turkey is of vital importance in terms of the peace in the Middle East and the relations between the West and the East. In conjunction with the full membership of Turkey, the EU would have a Muslim member country for the first time. Becoming an equal and strong member of the EU, Turkey can make significant contributions to the stability and development of the Middle East and greater East. Besides, Turkey would prove to construct a frank, constructive, and beneficial relationship for both sides between the Muslim and the Western worlds. In this way, Turkey could be a model country and success story for the Muslim world and help to eliminate the region's extremist religious groups. If the EU rejects Turkey due to the religious differences, this great mistake would be a great signal to the Muslim peoples in the world. The US can play a constructive role in bridging Turkey and the EU.

    Finally the US must keep its promises in Cyprus. Turkish side fully support the Annan Plan, however while the Greeks strongly rejected the UN Peace Plan. The US and the EU promised a lot to Turkish Cypriots and Turkey before the referendum. However the side who was punished is the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. The US and the EU did not keep their promises. Turkish people are frustrated with the double standards in Cyprus issue. People here think that the EU and the US support the Greek Cypriots because of religious solidarity. I hope Obama will keep the US' words to the Turkish Cypriots."

    Muzaffer Vatansever (JTW)
    (Edited by Kaitlin MacKenzie, JTW)

    Friday, 23 January 2009
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    Best Regards,
    Rabia Rahimbayeva
    • 24 Jan 2009, 12:42 pm