Turkish Business Club

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  • Dr. Nilgün Birgören
    Dr. Nilgün Birgören    Premium Member   Group moderator
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    Turkiye, U.S.: Strengthening Ties .. Analysis
    U.S. President Barack Obama will visit Turkiye on April 6-7 and meet with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The United States and Turkiye have many areas of mutual interest, including Iraq, Middle Eastern diplomatic efforts, Iran and Central Asia. Obama’s visit indicates that his administration recognizes Turkiye’s growing prominence, and it gives the United States a chance to coordinate policy with a rising power.

    Analysis:
    Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan confirmed late March 18 that U.S. President Barack Obama will be visiting Turkiye on April 6-7. In an interview with Turkish news channel Kanal 7, Erdogan said he had invited Obama to attend a meeting of the Alliance of Civilizations initiative in Istanbul on April 7, but “did not expect” Obama to arrive a day early for an official state visit to Ankara. “Combining the two occasions is very meaningful for us,” he added. Obama’s trip to Turkiye will follow a visit to London for the G-20 summit on the global financial crisis, a NATO summit in Strasbourg, France, and a trip to Prague to meet with EU leaders.

    Obama’s decision to visit Turkiye this early in the game highlights his administration’s recognition of Turkiye’s growing prominence in the region. The Turks have woken up after 90 years of post-Ottoman hibernation and are in the process of rediscovering a sphere of influence extending far beyond the Anatolian Peninsula. The Americans, on the other hand, are in the process of drawing down their presence in the Middle East in order to free up U.S. military capabilities to address pressing needs in Afghanistan. With the Turks stepping forward and the Americans stepping back, there are a number of issues of common interest that Obama and Erdogan will need to discuss.

    The first order of business is Iraq. The United States is putting its exit strategy into motion and is looking to Turkiye to serve as an exit route for U.S. troops and equipment from Iraq. The Turks would not have a problem with granting the United States such access, but they also want to make sure that U.S. withdrawal plans will not interfere with Turkiye’s intentions of keeping Iraqi Kurdistan in check. With key Kurdish leader and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani retiring soon and Kurdish demands over the oil-rich city of Kirkuk intensifying, the Turks want to make clear to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq that Ankara promptly will shut down any attempts to expand Kurdish autonomy. Turkiye will not hesitate to use the issue of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters hiding out in northern Ir aq as a pretext for future military incursions should the need arise to pressure the KRG in a more forceful way, but such tactics could run into complications if the United States intends to withdraw the bulk of its forces through northern Iraq. Therefore, the decision on where to base U.S. troops during the withdrawal process will be a political one, and one that will have to address Turkish concerns over the Kurds. Washington likely will see this as a reasonable price to pay, as it has other problems to handle.

    Beyond Iraq, the United States is looking to Turkiye as the Muslim regional heavyweight to take the lead in handling some of the knottier issues in the Middle East. The Israeli-Syrian peace talks that went public in 2008 were a Turkish initiative. These negotiations are now in limbo, with the Israelis still working to form a new government, but the Turks are looking to revive them in the near future. Turkiye, Israel, the United States and the Arab states all share an interest in bringing Syria into a Western alliance structure, with the aim of depriving Iran of its leverage in the Levant. However, the Syrians are setting an equally high price for their cooperation: Syrian domination over Lebanon. These negotiations are packed with potential deal breakers, but Turkiye intends to take on the challenge in the interest of securing its southern flank.

    Iran is another critical area where the United States and Turkiye see eye to eye. The fall of Saddam Hussein and the rise of the Shia in Iraq have given Iran a platform for projecting influence in the Arab world. But the Turks far outpace the Iranians in a geopolitical contest and will be instrumental in keeping Iranian expansionist goals in check. Erdogan’s outburst over Israel’s Gaza offensive was just one of many ways Turkiye has been working to assert its regional leadership, build up its credibility among Sunnis in the Arab world and override Iranian attempts to reach beyond its borders. At the same time, the Turks carry weight with the Iranians, who view Turkiye as a fellow great empire of the past and non-Arab partner in the Middle East. Washington may not necessarily need the Turks to mediate in its rocky negotiations with Iran, but it will rely heavily on Turkish clout in the region to help put the Iranians in their place.

    Some problems may arise, however, when U.S.-Turkish talks venture beyond the Middle East and enter areas where the Turkish and Russian spheres of influence overlap. Turkiye’s influence extends into Central Asia and deep into the Caucasus, where the Turks have a strong foothold in Azerbaijan and ties to Georgia, and are in the process of patching things up with the Armenians. As the land bridge between Europe and Asia, Turkiye is also the key non-Russian energy transit hub for the European market, and through its control of the Bosporus, it is the gatekeeper to the Black Sea. In each of these areas, the Turks bump into the Russians, another resurgent power that is on a tight timetable for extracting key concessions from the United States on a range of issues that revolve around Russia’s core imperative of protecting its former Soviet periphery from Western meddling.

    The U.S. administration and the Kremlin have been involved in intense negotiations over these demands. Washington is still sorting out which concessions it can make in return for Russian cooperation in allowing the United States access to Central Asia for supply routes to Afghanistan, and in applying pressure on Iran. As part of these negotiations, Obama will be meeting with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev at the G-20 summit and later in the summer in Moscow. Though it is still unclear just how much the United States is willing to give the Russians at this juncture — and how flexible the Turks will be in challenging Russia — Washington wants to make sure its allies, like Turkiye, are on the same page.

    Russia and Turkiye now have more reason to cooperate than collide, and recent diplomatic traffic between Moscow and Ankara certainly reflects this reality. In areas where the United States will want to apply pressure on Russia, such as on energy security for the Europeans, the Turks likely will resist rocking the boat with Moscow. The last thing Turkiye wants at this point is to give Russia a reason to politicize its trade relationship with Ankara, cause trouble for the Turks in the Caucasus or meddle in Turkiye’s Middle Eastern backyard. In short, there are real limits to what the United States can expect from Turkiye in its strategy against Russia.

    Obama and Erdogan evidently will have plenty to talk about when they meet in Ankara. Though the United States and Turkiye have much to sort out regarding Iraq, Syria, Iran and Russia, this visit will give Obama the stage to formally recognize Turkiye’s regional prowess and demonstrate a U.S. understanding of Turkiye’s growing independence. Washington can see that the Turks are already brimming with confidence in conducting their regional affairs, and can expect some bumps down the road when interests collide. But the sooner the Americans can start coordinating policy with a resurgent power like Turkiye, the better equipped Washington will be for conducting negotiations in other parts of the globe.

    I will be looking forward to your comments on the issue.
    Kind regards,
    Nilgun Birgoren
    • 21 Mar 2009, 10:49 pm
  • Dr. Nilgün Birgören
    Dr. Nilgün Birgören    Premium Member   Group moderator
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    Why Turkey Matters To The U.S.
    Melik Kaylan, 03.17.09, 12:00 AM EDT

    Obama will need all of his diplomatic skills in Ankara.
    President Obama’s upcoming state visit to Turkey on March 30 brings up the question: Why is Turkey important? What benefits accrue to the U.S. and its global strategy to have Turkey on board, and what is lost by the absence thereof? Yes, yes, NATO ally, moderate Islamic democracy, bridge between Europe and Asia, but what in practical terms does it all mean?

    Mr. Obama’s visit will surely furnish a massive photo-op on many levels–he will demonstrate how, in his administration, diplomacy will be the first recourse in a way that never convincingly happened in the Bush era. There will be a lot of noise about showing respect to Muslim nations; words like “dialogue” and “dignity” will be intoned gravely. The visit will make Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan look like a real statesman again after his mercurial behavior at Davos toward the Israeli president. But beyond the diplomatic and symbolic, what?

    Not so fast. Actually the diplomatic and symbolic matter tremendously in this region, something that the younger Bush grievously underestimated and the older Bush understood precisely. In Turkey specifically, such things matter for a host of reasons. Like the U.K. and Russia, Turkey suffers from post-Imperial confusion about its role, its identity and importance in the world

    The Turkish language as spoken in Turkey no longer translates easily across borders to other Turkic countries, and former Ottoman non-Turkic provinces have adopted other languages. Unlike Russia and the U.K., Turkey feels painfully isolated, under-informed, unarticulated. Nobody understands the Turkish point of view automatically, the way Aussies might understand the Brits or Belarusians the Russians. Conversely, it’s not easy for Turks to eavesdrop on or gain clues from other cultures. As a result, they are prone to all sorts of paranoias.

    During the second Gulf War, Turks developed acute suspicions about the long-term goals of the second Bush administration. Highly placed sources in the Turkish military told me that before the war they had sounded out their American counterparts on pre-war U.S. clandestine activities in the Iraqi Kurdish zone.

    Here’s what the Turks said in effect: “We kept being told, no, the U.S. keeps no secrets from you–but we knew otherwise. We had pictures of secret meetings with local Kurdish tribal leaders. We had sources there for years. We also knew that Iranians had spies everywhere, that the U.S. was blundering into minefields. We could have been helpful, but we were kept out in the cold. So we wondered, what are they up to with the Kurds that they don’t want us to know?”

    Even then, top Turkish leaders, Erdogan and the generals, publicly endorsed formal collaboration with the war. One top general said on television that even though the military was against the war and didn’t think it was good for Turkey, they understood that being locked out of it would be worse. He advised cooperation.

    In the end, a handful of Turkish parliamentarians mistakenly voted “no” to U.S. plans, that is to give U.S. troops access to Iraq via Turkey. The parliamentarians thought the “yes” vote was locked in, and they could grandstand harmlessly by voting “no.” Suddenly, it was up to the Speaker of the House to cast the deciding vote, and he knew that his political career would be finished if, with all the cameras rolling, he voted “yes”–because a “yes” vote was seen as agreeing with the entire George W. Bush project for the region, known in Turkey as the “Great Middle East Project.”

    A top U.S. bureaucrat who happened to be in parliament visiting–a close friend to the Bushies–told me, “It was very frustrating: such an important event and I was the only American there. I was there completely by accident. Not officially at all. If I’d been empowered, I could have talked to a few of them, twisted a few arms, made assurances, soothed egos and changed the vote. That’s all it needed. And no one was there to do it. The administration has only itself to blame.”

    See what I mean about the importance of diplomacy? Now, what about the “Great Middle East Project?” The Turks were convinced of a long-term neoconservative-designed blueprint to change the borders of the region. Pundits and papers discussed it incessantly. In this scenario, the Iraqi Kurds would be emboldened to unite with the Turkish Kurds to create a “Greater Kurdistan,” which would become a new, more pliant, client state of the U.S.

    This paranoid vision simply didn’t take into account how the U.S. functions, especially these days. That kind of thing was possible during the British or Russian Great Game era but really makes no sense in the present. Nevertheless, the Turks were convinced that U.S. strategy planned for a fragmenting of their country as the Brits had intended after World War I, and as happened unintentionally with Bosnia and Kosovo more recently.

    In many cases and places, diplomacy and symbolic actions matter. A lot. In the case of the second Gulf War, it mattered in unintended but important ways. The absence of massed U.S. troops in the north didn’t affect “Shock and Awe.” All the problems arose after that, with the occupation, when the allies could already move forces freely anywhere within Iraq. And when the Turks finally offered to send in 10,000 troops to help the allies, it was the Kurds who nixed it. Still, inadvertent damage ensued from the misunderstandings. The Turks grew noticeably warmer to Moscow. Erdogan began to make friends with Iran and Damascus, and stoked pan-Muslim sentiments for his own political gain.

    None of these new friendships are good for Turkey. Or for the West. President Obama’s first task then is to re-convince the Turks of America’s good intentions. He should clear away the paranoias and show how Turkey benefits if the U.S. succeeds. Having a nonregional friend is a tremendous asset for the Turks–they should take another look at their neighbors and wake up. But Mr. Obama should also find ways to re-initiate the westernization process in Turkey. Money and support should flow from Europe, too, not just to industry and politics but to culture and education, to counteract the Islamizing influences from the oil states.

    What are the practical benefits to the U.S.? Let us list them: Turkish troops in Afghanistan. Freer NATO naval access to the Black Sea to bolster Ukrainian and Georgian morale. Turkish help for Georgia. A pro-U.S. Turkish flanking threat to distract Iran. Ditto Syria. The continued flow of non-Arab, non-Russian oil from Azerbaijan to the world. Increased U.S.-friendly Turkish influence in Central Asia’s Turkic states to counteract Russian and Iranian influence (remember those U.S. bases?). A secular Muslim buffer in the region against Islamization.

    If the U.S. and Turkey act in unison, as they did in the Cold War, Turkey can tip the balance as a pro-Western force in the region’s new politics. But it will take all of President Obama’s diplomatic and symbolic skills, sustained over time, to turn things around.

    Melik Kaylan, a writer based in New York, writes a weekly column for Forbes.com. His story “Georgia In The Time of Misha” is featured in The Best American Travel Writing 2008.

    Source: http://www.forbes.com, 17.03.2009
    • 21 Mar 2009, 11:26 pm